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1 Introduction
The allocation of scarce resources is at the very heart of economic and political
theory. According to Robbins in his classic Essay on the Nature & Significance
of Economic Science, economics is the science which studies human behaviour
as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.
Political theories on distributive justice point in that same direction by focusing
on a fair or just allocation of goods in society.  
By contrast, such a pre-eminent role for scarcity and allocation issues seems to
be lacking in legal doctrine on public law. This may be considered remarkable
since several scholars have linked public law with allocation issues. For example,
the German legal philosopher Radbruch found the dividing line between private
law and public law in the two kinds of Aristotelian justice, corrective justice and
distributive justice: ‘Die ausgleichende Gerechtigkeit ist die Gerechtigkeit des
Privatrechts; die austeilende Gerechtigkeit ist die Gerechtigkeit des öffentlichen
Rechts.’  Although this distinction between corrective and distributive justice
has been criticized as defining the distinction between private and public law,
the idea of corrective justice is still present in private law, for example in
contract law.  Conversely, many areas of public law, such as telecommunications
law, environmental law, refugee law and social security law, deal with the
allocation of scarce resources in one way or another.  Once abstracting from
these specific areas, however, the so-called allocative  function of public law
seems to be overlooked nowadays in legal doctrine.  Therefore, some authors
have recommended this allocative function to be reinforced in the general
analysis of public law.  
In order to take up this challenge, it seems useful to start with an area of public
law where these allocation issues are very explicit. The most appropriate area for
this analysis is the area of so-called ‘limited public rights’. These limited public
rights occur in different areas of public law, e.g. telecommunications law,
gambling law and subsidy law, but have in common that the number of
individual rights available for grant is limited in advance to a maximum.
Whenever the number of applicants exceeds this maximum, these scarce rights
should be granted by means of an allocation procedure, like an auction or a
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lottery. 
From a general public law perspective, the relevant issue is which general rules
apply to the grant of limited public rights. Because of their general nature, these
so-called ‘allocation rules’ should be constructed as a direct consequence of
general principles of public law. However, legislation and case-law show that
there is still a gap between general principles of public law and allocation issues.
Even although some (semi-)general allocation rules can be found in legislation
or case-law, this set of general allocation rules is far from complete. In other
words, the existing set of general allocation rules is rather fragmentary.
Therefore, additional tools outside legal analysis are necessary in order to
identify general allocation rules. 
This article takes recourse to economic theory to bridge this gap. Its aim is to
answer the question how economic theory can be useful in deriving general
allocation rules from general principles of public law. There are several reasons
to have recourse to economic theory to bridge the gap. First, unlike legal theory,
economic theory provides for general terminology on the allocation of scarce
resources with concepts like efficiency and allocation properties. These general
concepts might be helpful in expanding existing allocation rules to general
allocation rules. Next, the general allocation rules identified in case-law until
now, seem to assume some kind of rationality among applicants.  This
rationality assumption is fundamental to economic theory, so this approach
might be a useful tool in explaining allocation rules developed until now.
Finally, in line with this explanatory power of economic theory, it might have
predictive power as well: if existing allocation rules can be understood with
reference to certain (economic) assumptions, then economic theory shows which
other allocation rules logically derive from these assumptions and therefore
should be part of a coherent legal system. 
Before starting this exercise, it is essential to distinguish the merits of economic
theory as compared to legal theory. Since – as Robbins stated – economic theory
is neutral with regard to the ends of allocation,  the issue which allocation
objectives are to be achieved and which allocation is just, remains outside the
scope of economics. In that respect, economic theory does not precede public
law, but succeeds it. However, once the allocation objectives have been
established in public law, economic theory shows which allocation rules
contribute to the attainment of these objectives and which do not. Thus,
economic theory may serve as a tool to understand and to criticize allocation
rules, given the chosen allocation objectives. 
This article has been structured as follows. After characterizing the grant of
limited public rights briefly (section 2) and sketching the first cautious steps in
EU case-law in the development of general allocation rules (section 3), the
allocation of limited public rights is dealt with from an economic perspective
(section 4). Section 5 illustrates how these economic results may be helpful in
deriving general allocation rules from general legal principles in a logical and
consistent manner. The following section 6 explores the relevance of the
identified general allocation rules for the analysis of public law in general.
Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Limited public rights: a characterization
For the purposes of this article, public rights are defined as individual rights
granted by a public authority. Examples of these public rights are authorizations,
permitting its holder to exercise an activity otherwise prohibited, and financial
grants (subsidies). For the grant of any such public right, an applicant should
satisfy one or more granting criteria. These granting criteria are absolute in the
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sense that the grant of a public right to a certain applicant only depends on the
question whether this applicant satisfies the granting criteria. In other words, it
does not matter whether other applicants satisfy these criteria as well. 
Whenever the number of public rights available for grant is limited to a
maximum M, sometimes referred to as a ceiling,  these public rights are called
limited.  This maximum may vary from one exclusive right to an arbitrary
number of rights, as long as the number of rights available for grant is limited to
a maximum. Given this maximum, it matters whether the right to be allocated is
divisible or indivisible. If a right is divisible, it can be divided into arbitrary small
pieces. As a result, any applicant may receive a positive (but small) amount of
this right. For example, financial grants are divisible, since money can be
awarded in arbitrary small pieces. If it is impossible to divide a public right into
arbitrary small pieces or if division would destroy its value, this right is called
indivisible.  
If the number of applicants N satisfying the granting criteria for some public
right exceeds the maximum M, limited public rights are called scarce. In those
circumstances, public authorities should apply an allocation procedure P in
order to grant these scarce rights. Such a grant of limited public rights is called
an allocation. Examples of allocation procedures are a lottery, allocation in
order of receipt of the applications (‘first come first served’), a comparative
assessment (‘beauty contest’ or ‘tender’), an auction, an equal division and a
proportional division. Every allocation procedure is characterized by one or
more allocation criteria. Unlike granting criteria, these allocation criteria involve
relative comparison of applications: an application should perform better on the
allocation criteria than other applications. In order to execute this comparison,
all applications should be submitted before a certain moment. 
The allocation of limited public rights is an exercise of distributive justice par
excellence. According to Weinrib, any exercise of distributive justice consists of
three elements: (1) the benefit or burden being distributed, (2) the persons
among whom it is distributed, and (3) the criterion according to which it is
distributed.  Applying a distribution or allocation criterion inevitably results in
the rejection of some applications that satisfy all granting criteria. In other
words, allocation results in subordination of applications.
3 A legal perspective to limited public rights
Given this general characterization of limited public rights, the relevant legal
question becomes whether there are general rules applying to any allocation of
limited public rights. These general allocation rules should take into account the
general characteristics of allocation issues, e.g. the ceiling M and the allocation
procedure P. Together, these general allocation rules can be said to constitute
general allocation law as a part of general public law. 
Given the lack of legal attention to the allocation function of public law, it should
not be very surprising that general legislation on administrative law is not a
useful source of general allocation law, neither at a European level nor at a
national level.  Instead, the ordinary legal approach to the grant of public rights
seems to be that these rights should be granted to any applicant who meets the
granting criteria.  This approach and the corresponding decision rules are,
however, insufficient when granting a limited number of public rights: whenever
the number of applicants exceeds the number of rights available, at least one
application satisfying all granting criteria should be rejected. 
In the absence of general allocation rules in legislation, general legal principles
may serve as a relevant source of allocation law. Recent case-law of the Court of
Justice of the European Union  shows that this holds in particular for the
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principles of legal certainty and equal treatment (equality). The principle of legal
certainty requires in general the rules of law to be clear, precise and predictable
as regards their effects, in particular where they may have unfavourable
consequences for individuals and undertakings.  The principle of equal
treatment, according to the Court, requires that comparable situations must not
be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the
same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified.  In order to be
objectively justified, a difference in treatment should be justified by a legitimate
objective (legitimacy), be appropriate for securing the attainment of this
legitimate objective (suitability), and not go beyond what is necessary to attain
this objective (necessity). The prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
nationality  and the consequent fundamental freedoms of movement  can be
considered as specific expressions of this principle of equality.  
Some scholars have claimed that the principle of equality or non-discrimination
has relevance in cases of scarcity only.  Others have doubted this claim,  but it
should be admitted at least that questions of equality are of particular
significance when allocating scarce resources.  The same holds for the principle
of legal certainty: since inevitably some applications should be rejected although
they satisfy all granting criteria, every allocation of limited public rights has
unfavourable consequences for at least one applicant. Therefore, the need for
clear, precise and predictable allocation rules should be evident from the outset.
Despite this potential importance of both principles to the allocation of limited
public rights, these principles do not refer in their wording explicitly to
allocation settings. Therefore, there remains some gap between these general
legal principles and allocation issues. However, by translating general legal
principles into more specific allocation principles, it may be possible to construct
allocation rules as a direct consequence or corollary of a general legal principle. 
To some extent, this ‘corollary approach’ is already visible in the Court’s case-
law. For example, in Ottica New Line, the Court considers that restrictions on
the freedom of establishment may be justified by the legitimate objective of the
protection of public health. This general objective may seek, more specifically, to
ensure even distribution of healthcare providers throughout the national
territory.  In fact, the Court translates a general legitimate objective (‘public
health’) into a specific allocation objective (‘even distribution’) in order to
evaluate a maximum number of authorizations for healthcare providers. 
Another example of this corollary approach is the obligation of transparency.
This obligation, sometimes referred to as a principle, is considered to be a
corollary of the principle of equality.  This obligation requires a public
authority to ensure, for the benefit of any potential applicant, a degree of
advertising sufficient to enable the right  to be opened up to competition and
the impartiality of the award procedures to be reviewed.  In the absence of any
call for competition, the award of this right may amount to indirect
discrimination on grounds of nationality.  In fact, the obligation of
transparency can be considered a tailor-made expression of the principle of
equality in an allocation context, since this obligation recognizes the need for
applications to be submitted before a certain moment in order to be compared
with each other. 
Under the Court’s corollary approach allocation rules are not being derived from
one legal principle exclusively. For example, in Costa and Cifone, the Court
derives the requirement that the conditions and detailed rules of a tendering
procedure must be drawn up in a clear, precise and unequivocal manner from
five overarching principles: the freedom of establishment,  the freedom to
provide services,  the principle of equal treatment, the obligation of
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transparency and the principle of legal certainty.  As a result, the attempts in
case-law to construct an allocation rule as a corollary of a general legal principle
may seem rather fragmentary and even arbitrary until now. As a consequence, it
is not clear for potential applicants which allocation rules will apply to the grant
of limited public rights. Therefore, it is necessary to embed this deductive
process in a more consistent framework.
4 Bridging the gap: economic theory
Economic theory might provide for such a consistent framework to derive
general allocation rules from general principles, since it contains general
concepts and results on the allocation of scarce resources. Such recourse to
economic theory is not new with regard to the allocation of limited public rights.
In fact, Ronald Coase’s founding articles in the economic analysis of law, ‘The
Federal Communications Commission’ (1959) and ‘The Problem of Social Cost’
(1960),  address exactly this issue of allocation of scarce resources by public
authorities. What is new, however, is the function of economic theory to identify
and explain general allocation rules and thereby bridge the gap between the
allocation of scarce resources and general principles of public law. 
Several branches of economic theory deal with the allocation of scarce resources
explicitly, like resource allocation theory  and auction theory.  In short,
resource allocation theory analyzes general properties of allocation mechanisms.
These properties can be concentrated around some central ideas, like efficiency,
equality and solidarity.  Resource allocation theory provides for some intuitive
and elementary properties any allocation procedure might satisfy and explains
the elementary relationships between those properties. Since resource allocation
theory deals with properties of allocation mechanisms in general, it does not
always take into account strategic considerations of participants in these
allocation mechanisms.  
The well-known rationality assumption,  holding that parties maximize their
individual welfare, does not come into play until allocation mechanisms are
considered as strategic games. This holds for game theory in general  and for
auction theory in particular.  An auction is usually considered to be an
allocation procedure with the allocation criterion being a financial bid. The
results of auction theory, however, may be relevant for other allocation
procedures as well. For example, allocation in order of receipt of the applications
can be considered as a ‘waiting line auction’ in which the applicants’ waiting
times are their bids.  If an allocation procedure contains more allocation
criteria than the price only, this procedure can be considered a multidimensional
auction.  
Considering the allocation of limited public rights from a game-theoretic
perspective, the set of players consists of any party that might satisfy the
granting criteria and therefore can be considered a potential applicant. Since the
object to be allocated is a right (instead of an obligation), any potential applicant
assigns a positive value ν > ο to that right. This value, which represents the
applicant’s willingness to pay for this right, may vary among potential
applicants, for example because of differences in the cost structure of the
applicants’ firms. Auction theory traditionally distinguishes two auction models,
the private values model and the common value model. In case of private values,
every bidder knows his own value, but this value is unknown to other bidders as
well as to the allocating authority. By contrast, in case of common values, the
unknown value of the right is the same to everyone, but bidders have different
private information about this true value.  In reality, auctions are not
exclusively private value or common value, but share characteristics of both
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models.  
Auction theory shows that optimal bidding behaviour, i.e. bidding behaviour in
which rational bidders maximize their individual welfare, may depend on the
number of available rights M, the number of applicants N, the allocation
procedure P and the values ν bidders assign to the rights. For example, in a first-
price auction in which the winning bidder pays his own bid for the right at issue,
an applicant’s optimal bid depends on the number of applicants N and the
estimated values other bidders assign to this right.  By contrast, in a second-
price auction in which the winning bidder pays the highest losing bid, an
applicant does not need this information to determine his optimal bid; this
optimal bid is equal to his own value.  
Auction theory does not only guide rational bidders in determining their optimal
bids. Moreover, it suggests which information should be made available by
allocating authorities to facilitate optimal bidding behaviour. Besides, auction
theory shows whether allocating authorities may achieve their own allocation
objectives, given the choice for some allocation mechanism. The most prominent
objectives in auction theory are efficiency and revenue maximization. Efficiency
implies that the rights are awarded to the parties who value them most, whereas
revenue maximization holds that all the profits of the allocation flow to the
allocating authority.  In an auction, efficiency and individual welfare
maximization may coincide under certain conditions.  For example, in an
ascending-bid auction, any rational bidder will increase his bid until this bid
exceeds his (private) value. As a result, the right is awarded to the bidder with
the highest value at a price equal to the second-highest value, since the last
competing bidder drops out once this price level has been reached.  Such an
efficient outcome is guaranteed neither in a lottery nor under allocation in order
of receipt of the applications (‘first come, first served’). With regard to rights
giving access to a certain market, auction theory shows the need of
distinguishing the above-mentioned efficiency of the allocation (allocative
efficiency) from efficiency of the so-called aftermarket. Whereas allocative
efficiency deals with the values of the bidding producers only, efficiency of the
aftermarket takes into account both producer and consumer surplus. As a result,
allocative efficiency does not need to coincide with efficiency of the aftermarket.
For example, if an incumbent wins a second licence in an auction instead of a
new entrant, the monopolistic market is maintained, whereas consumers might
have profited from a duopolistic market.  
In sum, allocation theory and auction theory provide us with a set of general
concepts and results on the allocation of scarce resources. Although these results
should be understood within the set of assumptions and definitions guiding the
underlying theoretical models, allocation theory might be helpful in deriving
general allocation rules from general legal principles by bridging the gap
between these rules and principles.
5 Some general allocation rules
The corollary approach identified in section 3 requires allocation rules to be
constructed as a corollary of a legal principle. In the following, some general
allocation rules are considered in their relation to general legal principles with
reference to results from allocation theory. These allocation rules do not aim to
constitute a complete set of general rules of allocation law, but merely clarify the
intended approach.
Equality: equal treatment
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Section 3 mentioned already that, according to the Court’s case-law, the
principle of equality implies an obligation of transparency, requiring a sufficient
degree of prior advertising. Although allocation theory does not underlie this
rule explicitly, this rule aims to promote competition and therefore an efficient
outcome. What is more, allocation theory might be helpful in clarifying which
information should be made available in advance in order to ensure that any
interested party may take the decision to apply on the basis of all the relevant
information. In fact, there seem to be good reasons to take recourse to auction
theory, since the Court’s referential point of ‘reasonably informed tenderers
exercising ordinary care’  assumes some kind of rational and informed bidders.
In this respect, auction theory shows that the size of the ceiling M, the allocation
procedure P and the number of bidders N might influence the undertakings’
bidding behaviour. Therefore, economic analysis provides for arguments to
include this kind of information in the prior advertising. 
Given that the number of applicants N satisfying the granting criteria exceeds
the ceiling M, allocation theory shows that equal treatment of these applicants is
possible as long as these rights are divisible. Under that condition, any applicant
can be awarded the same amount M/N. In case of indivisible rights, however,
such an equal outcome is impossible, unless the rights are not awarded at all.
The need to allocate this right (efficiency)  might be considered a specific
allocation objective justifying the denial of equal outcomes. In short, allocation
theory shows which allocation procedures are suitable to guarantee equal
outcomes and which procedures are not. 
If there is a need to distinguish between applicants that have been admitted to
the allocation procedure, then equal treatment of equals translated into an
allocation context requires applicants with the same score on the allocation
criteria to be treated equally. In case of a tie, a lottery may bring relief provided
every applicant has equal probability to win. Again, allocation theory shows
which allocation procedures are suitable to attain a certain allocation objective.
Moreover, allocation theory provides for another relevant allocation property
known as impartiality or anonymity. An allocation procedure is impartial if an
exchange of the scores of two applicants implies an exchange of their shares in
the outcome. In other words, if an allocation procedure is impartial, then the
resulting allocation depends on the scores of the applicants only, hence not on
their identities. As such, this allocation property of impartiality can be
considered a specified expression in an allocation context of the general legal
principle that a public authority shall perform its duties without prejudice.
Furthermore, economic theory shows that impartiality implies equal treatment
of equal scores: if an allocation procedure is impartial, it respects equal
treatment of equal scores as well (but not vice versa).  As a consequence, if a
coherent legal system requires allocation procedures to be impartial, then this
legal system should require allocation procedures to respect equal treatment of
equal scores as well.
Equality: unequal treatment
We saw in section 3 that the general principle of equality requires any unequal
treatment of equals to be justified objectively. In particular, any such unequal
treatment must be justified by a legitimate objective (legitimacy), must be
appropriate for securing the attainment of this legitimate objective (suitability),
and should not go beyond what is necessary to attain this objective (necessity). 
First of all, allocation theory does not tell us which allocation objectives are
legitimate. At this point, public law precedes economic theory: the legitimacy of
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allocation objectives should be established without reference to economic
theory. In this respect, it is relevant to note that the Court does not accept
grounds of an economic nature as legitimate reasons justifying a restriction to
fundamental freedoms.  This does not mean that considerations of efficiency
are completely irrelevant in the choice of allocation criteria. This point can be
clarified with an example from telecommunications law. According to the
Authorization Directive, Member States may allow their administrative
authorities to impose fees for the rights of use for radio frequencies which reflect
the need to ensure the optimal use of these resources.  In Belgacom, the Court
recalls that the authorization to use public property which constitutes a scarce
resource enables the holder of that authorization to make significant economic
gains and grants that holder advantages as compared with other operators who
are also seeking to use and exploit that resource. This justifies imposing a charge
which reflects the value of the use of the scarce resource at issue.  In other
words, an optimal or efficient use of scarce resources is considered to be a
legitimate allocation objective, but this allocation rule does not follow from
economic theory. At most, economic theory reminds legal doctrine to use the
term ‘efficiency’ carefully, since this economic term may have different meanings
(cf. section 4). 
With respect to the requirement of suitability, allocation theory is far more
relevant: it provides for arguments whether an allocation procedure is
appropriate to attain a chosen allocation objective, as we saw already with
regard to equal division. The Court seems willing to accept such allocation-
theoretic arguments. For example, it has considered that the fixing of a fee by
reference to the amounts raised through an auction, may be an appropriate
method for determining the value of radio frequencies, since these amounts bear
some relation to the foreseeable profits from the radio frequencies concerned.
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that – according to auction theory
– an auction is not always an appropriate method to achieve this allocation
objective of efficiency. In that respect, economic theory might criticize case-law
which neglects essential assumptions underlying economic results. 
Finally, allocation theory does not seem to be very relevant with regard to the
necessity requirement: it does not provide for arguments why an allocation
procedure is more or less restrictive than another allocation procedure. At most,
allocation procedures with a pricing rule, i.e. requiring applicants to pay their
bids, may be considered more restrictive than allocation procedures without a
pricing rule. In Bressol, the Court doubts whether a selection process for medical
students based not on the aptitude of the candidates but on chance is necessary
to attain the legitimate objective of maintaining a balanced high-quality medical
service.  This doubt does not seem to follow from arguments derived from
economic theory, but rather from arguments derived from theories on
distributive justice (‘merit’) that come into play when making a choice between
different allocation procedures.
Legal certainty: amending the allocation rules
The above-mentioned allocation rule that all the relevant information on the
allocation should be made public in advance, is constructed in the Court’s case-
law as a corollary of both the principle of equality and the principle of legal
certainty. One might expect the necessary counterpart of this requirement to be
that allocation rules may not be amended afterwards. However, case-law shows
a more subtle approach: allocating authorities may not amend their allocation
rules during or after the submission period to the detriment of one or more
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applicants.  
A more specific expression of this principle of legal certainty can be found in
Dutch subsidy law. This semi-general allocation rule  holds that if a reduction
of the subsidy ceiling is notified after the start of the application period, this
notification shall not affect applications previously submitted.  This legal
provision is the counterpart of the legal provision requiring a subsidy ceiling to
be notified before the start of the application period.  Both provisions have a
basis in the principle of legal certainty: any applicant should be able to take into
account the possibility of his application being rejected by single reference to the
ceiling, even if he satisfies all granting criteria.  
At close reading, this legal provision in subsidy law is more far-reaching than its
above-mentioned equivalent in case-law: the provision in subsidy law assumes
that a reduction of a ceiling can never be advantageous to applications
previously submitted. Economic theory shows in which cases this assumption is
justified, i.e. if the allocation procedure satisfies the property of resource
monotonicity. In short, this property supposes that if the amount M to allocate
increases, all other things being equal, each party should receive at least as much
as he did initially.  In other words, no applicant will be disadvantaged by an
increase of the ceiling. By contrast, a reduction of the ceiling will not advantage
any applicant, as a result of which any initial applicant can be expected to
oppose a reduction of the ceiling. 
Thus, whereas legal analyzis constructs this legal provision in subsidy law as a
corollary of the principle of legal certainty, allocation theory reveals the implicit
assumption underlying this provision. As such, it explains the existing allocation
rule. Moreover, allocation theory shows that this allocation rule may result in
reverse effects if an allocation procedure does not satisfy this property of
resource monotonicity.  This raises the question whether resource
monotonicity is a property any allocation procedure should satisfy. Economic
theory does not provide for a definitive answer to this question, but at least
shows unexpected effects if an allocation procedure does not satisfy this
property. Besides, the economic property of resource monotonicity shows what
should be a consistent extension of this allocation rule: an increase of a subsidy
ceiling is not problematic and therefore allowed, at least not from the
perspective of the initial applicants, unless the allocation procedure is not
resource monotone. Insofar, allocation theory has predictive power: applicants
should consider the possibility of the ceiling being increased during the
allocation procedure. Finally, allocation theory shows the relationship between
this property and other properties of allocation procedures. In particular, if an
allocation procedure satisfies the properties of impartiality and population
monotonicity, holding that an increase in the number of applicants N will not be
to the advantage of any initial applicant, this procedure satisfies the property of
resource monotonicity as well.  Therefore, any coherent legal system that
requires allocation procedures to be impartial and population monotone, should
require these procedures to be resource monotone as well. 
Once we shift our attention from the ceiling M to the allocation procedure P,
allocation theory explains why a legal provision permitting for amendments to
the allocation procedure is lacking in subsidy law: any amendment to the
allocation procedure benefiting certain applicants, will harm other applicants
without doubt, given the limited availability of rights. Therefore, it should be not
surprising that the Court prohibits the allocation criteria being amended in any
way during the allocation procedure.  Again, economic allocation properties
explain the existence (and absence) of general allocation rules.
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6 Allocation beyond limited public rights?
The previous section showed how allocation theory can contribute to a
consistent extension of the Court’s corollary approach under which general
allocation rules are constructed as a corollary of general legal principles. The
next question is whether this allocation perspective may be relevant outside the
area of limited public rights as well. At first glance, the answer to this question
seems to be negative: exactly because the above-mentioned allocation rules are
tailor-made for an allocation context, e.g. by explicit references to ceilings and
allocation procedures, they seem to be irrelevant outside this allocation context. 
On second thought, however, it should be realized that any scheme of public
rights, irrespective whether these rights are limited in number or not, has a
distributive effect: if an applicant does not satisfy the predetermined granting
criteria, he will not be awarded the public right at issue.  This distributive effect
of granting criteria is very clear for the requirement that a fee is being paid: the
higher the fee, the smaller the number of interested parties. Moreover, such a fee
contributes to efficiency in the sense that all applicants satisfying the granting
criteria, assign a value to this right at least equal to this fee. The distributive
effect of other granting criteria, e.g. the condition that a right shall be rejected ‘in
the interest of public health’, is less clear from the outset. However, an allocation
perspective to public law may urge public authorities to unveil the allocative
effect of such granting criteria and require them to restate the granting criteria
in a more precise manner, for example by making explicit the maximum
following from a granting criterion like ‘public health’.  Until now, public law is
somewhat ambiguous towards this unveiling process. Although it is settled case-
law that all granting criteria should be clear and objective,  the Court has
considered as well that too explicit granting criteria may result in too restrictive
requirements, since it may be difficult to specify precise thresholds in advance
without introducing a degree of rigidity likely to be even more restrictive of a
fundamental freedom.  
Once this distributive effect of other, non-limited schemes of public rights is
identified, consequent allocation rules become relevant. For example, a broad
interpretation of the condition that an authorisation shall be rejected in the
interest of ‘public health’, amounts to the establishment of a small maximum.
Next, changing the rules after the receipt of applications in a non-limited
authorization scheme can be just as detrimental as changing those rules in a
limited authorization scheme. With reference to the allocation property of
resource monotonicity, it can be claimed that a change afterwards in the
interpretation of a granting criterion should not disadvantage applications
previously submitted. Furthermore, if there is indeed an (implicit) limit to the
extent in which a certain activity is being permitted or supported, then the lack
of making this ceiling explicit may amount to an implicit choice for allocation in
the order of receipt of the allocations. In particular, an applicant may find
himself confronted with his application being rejected in the interest of ‘public
health’, because ‘public health’ would not bear any new entrant. Perhaps, other
allocation procedures would have been more appropriate in securing the
attainment of ‘public health’ and therefore should be preferred to ‘first come,
first served’ allocation. Anyway, economic theory might provide for an answer to
this suitability issue, more than legal doctrine. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the interaction between allocation of limited
public rights and higher-level allocation in public law. In fact, this interaction
reflects the interaction in political theories on distributive justice between local
or micro justice, dealing with the allocation of a scarce good in a particular
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setting, and global or macro justice, concerning the allocation of scarce goods
and burdens over society as a whole.  It should be realized that limited
availability of resources (water, soil, frequencies, money) does not need to result
in a scheme of limited public rights. Instead, the allocation of such limited
resources may take place at a higher level by assigning alternative modes of use
to different parts of this scarce resource.  The relevant issue then becomes
which allocation rules and principles apply to this process of higher-level
allocation. Allocation theory might be helpful in developing these higher-level
allocation rules, since public law is confronted again with the tension between
unlimited ends and limited means, which is at the core of economic theory.
7 Concluding remarks
Although public law is sometimes said to deal with issues of distributive justice,
an allocation perspective is usually lacking in the legal analyzis of public law.
Nevertheless, these allocation issues arise manifestly in case of so-called ‘limited
public rights’: if the number of public rights available for grant is limited to a
maximum and if the number of applicants satisfying the granting criteria
exceeds this maximum, an allocation procedure should be applied in order to
award those scarce rights. From the perspective of general public law, the
relevant question is which general allocation rules apply to these allocations of
limited public rights. 
The Court’s case-law shows an approach under which general allocation rules
are constructed as a direct consequence or ‘corollary’ of general legal principles,
such as the principle of legal certainty and the principle of equal treatment. This
approach of translating general legal principles into general allocation rules is
rather arbitrary and fragmentary until now. This article shows that economic
theory is helpful in expanding this legal ‘corollary approach’ in a consistent
manner. First of all, some elements of general principles of law, e.g. the
suitability requirement as part of the principle of equality, ask for a non-legal
evaluation of allocation procedures, which can be provided for by economic
theory. Next, the rationality assumption which is at the heart of (parts of)
economic theory, has been central to some existing allocation rules. As a
consequence, economic theory can explain these allocation rules. However, by
explaining those rules, economic theory shows at the same time their limits by
revealing underlying economic assumptions and properties of allocation
procedures. As far as these assumptions and properties are accepted, economic
theory provides for logical arguments why public law should accept other
allocation rules that derive from these assumptions as well, even though these
other rules have not been established in legislation or case-law until now.
Otherwise, allocation law would not be a consistent and coherent part of public
law anymore. 
Although this allocation-theoretic approach is not able to account for all
allocation rules which have been developed in case-law, it gives at least a solid
framework for a consistent analysis of many allocation rules. What is more, this
allocation-theoretic analysis of rules with respect to the allocation of limited
public rights might have a spillover effect towards a general legal analysis of
public law from the perspective of distributive justice. In particular, economic
theory provides for the tools to unveil the allocation issues that are central to
public law, but hidden in its analysis until now.
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